This contribution to the symposium on Annalisa Coliva’s Extended Rationality is largely sympathetic with the moderate view of the structure of epistemic warrant which is defended in the book. However, it takes issue with some aspects of Coliva’s Wittgenstein-inspired ‘hinge epistemology’, focussing especially on her conception of propositional warrant, her treatment of epistemic closure, her antirealist conception of truth, and the significance of her answer to so-called Humean scepticism.

中文翻译：

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扩展理性：关于认股权证、认知封闭、真理和怀疑主义的一些疑问

这篇对 Annalisa Coliva 的扩展理性研讨会的贡献在很大程度上与本书所捍卫的认知保证结构的温和观点一致。然而，它对科利瓦受维特根斯坦启发的“铰链认识论”的某些方面提出了质疑，特别关注她的命题保证概念、她对认知封闭的处理、她的反实在论的真理概念以及她对所谓休谟的回答的意义怀疑论。