In his recent work, Duncan Pritchard defends a novel Wittgensteinian response to the problem of radical scepticism. The response makes essential use of a form of non-epistemicism about the nature of hinge commitments. According to non-epistemicism, hinge commitments cannot be known or grounded in rational considerations, such as reasons and evidence. On Pritchard’s version of non-epistemicism, hinge commitments express propositions but cannot be believed. This is the non-belief theory of hinge commitments ( NBT ). One of the main reasons in favour of NBT over rival anti-sceptical Wittgensteinian views is that it has less theoretical costs and revisionary consequences than its rivals. In this paper, I argue that NBT fares at least as bad as its rivals in terms of its theoretical costs and revisionism. In particular, I argue that NBT is inconsistent with certain cases of philosophical disagreement; that it faces worries with mental-state scepticism; and that it faces difficulties in explaining how we can represent ourselves as committed to hinge commitments.

中文翻译：

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修正主义、怀疑主义和铰链承诺的非信仰理论

在他最近的工作中，邓肯·普里查德 (Duncan Pritchard) 捍卫了维特根斯坦对激进怀疑主义问题的新颖回应。该回应主要使用了一种关于铰链承诺性质的非认识论形式。根据非认识论，铰链承诺不能被知道或基于理性考虑，例如理由和证据。在普里查德的非认识论版本中，铰链承诺表达了命题，但不能被相信。这就是铰链承诺（NBT）的非信念理论。支持 NBT 而非竞争对手的反怀疑维特根斯坦主义观点的主要原因之一是，与竞争对手相比，它的理论成本和修正后果更少。在本文中，我认为 NBT 在理论成本和修正主义方面的表现至少与其竞争对手一样糟糕。特别是，我认为 NBT 与某些哲学分歧的情况不一致；它面临着精神状态怀疑的担忧；并且它在解释我们如何能够表示自己致力于铰链承诺方面面临困难。