This article discusses Keith DeRose’s discussion of the lottery problem in chapter 5 of his recent The Appearance of Ignorance. I agree with a lot of it but also raise some critical points and questions and make some friendly proposals. I discuss different ways to set up the problem, go into the difference (quite relevant here) between knowing and ending inquiry, propose to distinguish between two different kinds of lotteries, add to the defense of the idea that one can know lottery propositions, give a critical discussion of DeRose’s contextualist solution to the problem, and support his defense against an absurdity objection with additional arguments.

中文翻译：

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德罗斯谈彩票

本文讨论 Keith DeRose 在他最近的 The Appearance of Ignorance 的第 5 章中对彩票问题的讨论。我同意很多，但也提出一些关键点和问题，并提出一些友好的建议。我讨论了设置问题的不同方法，进入了知道和结束询问之间的区别（这里相当相关），提出区分两种不同类型的彩票，增加对可以知道彩票命题的想法的辩护，给出对 DeRose 对问题的情境主义解决方案的批判性讨论，并支持他对荒谬反对意见的辩护，并附上其他论据。