One common problem with anti-skepticism and skepticism alike is their failure to account for our sometimes conflicting epistemic intuitions. In order to address this problem and provide a new direction for solving the skeptical puzzle, I consider a modified version of the puzzle that is based on knowledge claims about appearances and does not result in a paradox. I conclude that combining the elements of both the original and modified puzzle can potentially guide us towards solutions that can fully explain the conflict of epistemic intuitions.

中文翻译：

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外观的力量

反怀疑主义和怀疑主义的一个常见问题是它们未能解释我们有时相互矛盾的认知直觉。为了解决这个问题并为解决怀疑论难题提供新的方向，我考虑了该难题的修改版本，该版本基于关于外观的知识声明并且不会导致悖论。我的结论是，将原始谜题和修改后的谜题的元素结合起来，可能会引导我们找到可以完全解释认知直觉冲突的解决方案。