Philosophical scepticism is sometimes thought to presuppose doxastic voluntarism, the claim that we are able to believe or disbelieve propositions at will. This is problematic given that doxastic voluntarism itself is a controversial position. I examine two arguments for the view that scepticism presupposes voluntarism. I show that they rely on different versions of a depiction of scepticism as a conversion narrative. I argue that one version of this narrative does presuppose voluntarism, but the other does not. Moreover, alternative versions of the narrative are available. I conclude that scepticism does not presuppose voluntarism.

中文翻译：

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怀疑主义是否以自愿主义为前提？

哲学怀疑主义有时被认为以信奉唯意志论为前提，即我们能够随意相信或不相信命题的主张。鉴于信奉自愿主义本身是一个有争议的立场，这是有问题的。我检查了关于怀疑主义以自愿主义为前提的观点的两个论点。我表明他们依赖于不同版本的怀疑主义描述作为转换叙事。我认为这种叙述的一个版本确实以自愿为前提，但另一个版本则没有。此外，还有其他版本的叙述可用。我的结论是怀疑主义并不以自愿主义为前提。