Heightened awareness of the origins of our moral judgments pushes many in the direction of moral skepticism, in the direction of thinking we are unjustified in holding our moral judgments on a realist understanding of the moral truths. A classic debunking argument fleshes out this worry: the best explanation of our moral judgments does not appeal to their truth, so we are unjustified in holding our moral judgments. But it is unclear how to get from the explanatory premise to the debunking conclusion. This paper shows how to get from here to there by way of epistemic insensitivity. First, we reconstruct Richard Joyce’s evolutionary debunking argument from insensitivity. Second, we raise epistemological difficulties for Joyce’s argument. Third, we develop and defend a new debunking argument from insensitivity.

中文翻译：

---

从不敏感中揭穿论点

对我们道德判断起源的认识的提高将许多人推向了道德怀疑主义的方向，在思考的方向上，我们将道德判断建立在对道德真理的现实主义理解上是不合理的。一个经典的揭穿论证充实了这种担忧：对我们的道德判断的最佳解释并不符合它们的真实性，因此我们坚持自己的道德判断是不合理的。但不清楚如何从解释性前提得出揭穿结论。本文展示了如何通过认知不敏感的方式从这里到那里。首先，我们从麻木不仁中重构了理查德乔伊斯的进化论揭穿论点。其次，我们为乔伊斯的论证提出了认识论上的困难。第三，我们从麻木不仁中发展并捍卫了一个新的揭穿论点。