A number of thinkers suggest that, given certain conditions, it’s possible that any concrete human nature could have been united hypostatically to the second Person of the Trinity. Oliver Crisp argues that a potency to have been possibly hypostatically united to the Logos is an important part of what it means for a human person to be made in the image of God. Against this line of reasoning, and building on an argument in print by Andrew Jaeger, I argue two things: first, that many metaphysics of human persons on offer fail to allow the Logos possibly to unite hypostatically to just any concrete human nature. And this is because, given the necessity of identity (if x = y, necessarily x = y), every metaphysics that deploys an identity relation between a human person and her human nature or some essential component of her human nature fails to allow concrete human natures to be identical to any other person than they in fact are or else to lack some essential component that is identical to any other person than it in fact is. And, in the Incarnation, the Logos does not unite with a person. Second, supposing the preceding line of reasoning goes through, I argue that Oliver Crisp’s thesis about the imago Dei is mistaken, provided that it relies on a metaphysics of human persons that deploys an identity relation between a person and her concrete human nature or else some essential component of her concrete human nature.

中文翻译：

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身份、化身和神的意象

许多思想家认为，在特定条件下，任何具体的人性都有可能与三位一体的第二位格实体结合。奥利弗·克里斯普（Oliver Crisp）认为，一种可能与逻各斯实体结合的效力，是按照上帝的形象造人的意义的一个重要部分。反对这一推理路线，并以 Andrew Jaeger 发表的论据为基础，我提出两件事：第一，所提供的许多人类形而上学未能允许逻各斯实体与任何具体的人性结合起来。这是因为，鉴于身份的必要性（如果 x = y，必然 x = y），每一种在人与她的人性或她人性的某些基本组成部分之间部署同一关系的形而上学都未能允许具体的人性与事实上的任何其他人相同，或者缺少某些基本组成部分与任何其他人相同，而不是实际上。而且，在化身中，逻各斯并不与一个人联合。其次，假设前面的推理路线通过，我认为奥利弗·克里斯普关于上帝形象的论点是错误的，前提是它依赖于人的形而上学，在人与其具体的人性之间部署了身份关系，或者其他一些她具体的人性的重要组成部分。