This paper aims to outline a counterfactual theory of divine atemporal causation that avoids problems of preemption. As a result, the presentation of the analysis is structured such that my counterfactual analysis directly addresses preemption issues. If these problems can be avoided, the theist is well on her way to proposing a usable metaphysical concept of atemporal divine causation. In the first section, I outline Lewis’ original counterfactual analysis as well as how these cases of preemption cause problems for his analysis. In particular, two cases of preemption have proven problematic for counterfactual analyses: late preemption and trumping preemption. In the second section, I propose a counterfactual analysis of divine causation that is not subject to these problems of preemption. I present a counterfactual analysis of timeless divine causation, supplemented by a definition of what it means for God to allow an event to happen. In the third section, I argue this analysis is not prey to problems of preemption.

中文翻译：

---

先发制人与神因的反事实分析

本文旨在概述一种避免先发制人问题的神圣非时间因果关系的反事实理论。因此，分析的呈现结构使得我的反事实分析直接解决了抢占问题。如果这些问题可以避免，那么有神论者就可以很好地提出一个可用的非时间神圣因果关系的形而上学概念。在第一部分，我概述了 Lewis 最初的反事实分析，以及这些抢占案例如何给他的分析带来问题。特别是，两种抢占情况已被证明对反事实分析存在问题：后期抢占和胜过抢占。在第二部分，我提出了对不受这些先发制人问题影响的神圣因果关系的反事实分析。我提出了对永恒的神圣因果关系的反事实分析，并辅以对上帝允许事件发生意味着什么的定义。在第三部分，我认为这种分析不是抢占问题的牺牲品。