It is widely thought that Atemporalism—the view that, because God is “outside” of time, he does not fore know anything (rather, his knowledge is timeless )—constitutes a unique solution to the problem of freedom and foreknowledge. However, as I argue here, in order for Atemporalism to escape certain worries (raised independently by Alvin Plantinga and Linda Zagzebski), the view must appeal to the dependence of God’s timeless knowledge on our actions. I then argue that, because it must appeal to such dependence, Atemporalism is crucially similar to the recent sempiternalist accounts proposed by Trenton Merricks, Philip Swenson, and Jonathan Westphal, and I conclude by briefly sketching some implications of this result.

中文翻译：

---

非时间性和依赖

人们普遍认为，非时间论——认为因为上帝“在时间之外”，他不知道任何事情（相反，他的知识是永恒的）——构成了对自由和预知问题的独特解决方案。然而，正如我在此论证的，为了使非时间主义摆脱某些担忧（由 Alvin Plantinga 和 Linda Zagzebski 独立提出），该观点必须诉诸于上帝对我们行为的永恒知识的依赖。然后我争辩说，因为它必须诉诸这种依赖性，所以非时间主义与最近由特伦顿·梅里克斯、菲利普·斯文森和乔纳森·韦斯特法尔提出的半永久主义描述极为相似，最后我简要概述了这一结果的一些含义。