In this article, I contribute to the debate between two philosophical traditions—the Kantian and the Aristotelian—on the requirements of criminal responsibility and the grounds for excuse by taking this debate to a new context: international criminal law. After laying out broadly Kantian and Aristotelian conceptions of criminal responsibility, I defend a quasi-Aristotelian conception, which affords a central role to moral development, and especially to the development of moral perception, for international criminal law. I show than an implication of this view is that persons who are substantially and non-culpably limited in their capacity for ordinary moral perception warrant an excuse for engaging in unlawful conduct. I identify a particular set of conditions that trigger this excuse, and then I systematically examine it as applied to the controversial case of former-child-soldier-turned leader of the Lord’s Resistance Army, Dominic Ongwen, who is currently at trial at the International Criminal Court.

中文翻译：

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美德伦理、刑事责任和多米尼克·翁文

在这篇文章中，我通过将这场辩论带到一个新的背景：国际刑法，为两种哲学传统——康德和亚里士多德——之间关于刑事责任的要求和辩解理由的辩论做出贡献。在广泛阐述康德和亚里士多德的刑事责任概念之后，我捍卫准亚里士多德的概念，它对国际刑法的道德发展，尤其是道德观念的发展起着核心作用。我展示的这个观点的一个含义是，那些在普通道德感知能力方面受到实质性和无罪限制的人，可以为从事非法行为提供借口。我确定了触发这个借口的一组特定条件，