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Authoritarian survival strategies and elite churn: The case of North Korea
International Area Studies Review Pub Date : 2020-06-01 , DOI: 10.1177/2233865920920740 John Ishiyama 1 , Taekbin Kim 1
International Area Studies Review Pub Date : 2020-06-01 , DOI: 10.1177/2233865920920740 John Ishiyama 1 , Taekbin Kim 1
Affiliation
How do autocrats interact with authoritarian elites? This is a question that has gained increasing scholarly attention over the past decade. In this article, using the case of North Korea we develop a set of theoretical expectations for “elite churn” or changes in the composition of the elite (either in terms of promotions, demotions, or new entrants) resulting from moving around elites from office to office (or “elite shuffle”) and bringing in new elites. We test a number of theoretical expectations derived from the existing literature on elite management in autocracies and then examine these expectations using a panel data set of 351 members of the North Korean elite from 1948–2017. Taking into account leadership characteristics, threats to the regime (both internal and external), external opportunities, and structural factors, we find that the explanation for elite churn in North Korea is very leader specific, and is much more pronounced under Kim Jong Un than his predecessors. This suggests that Kim Jong Un’s position was much more tenuous than his father’s and grandfather’s and likely continues to be so.
中文翻译:
威权生存策略和精英流失:以朝鲜为例
独裁者如何与专制精英互动?这是一个在过去十年中越来越受到学术关注的问题。在本文中,我们以朝鲜为例,对“精英流失”或精英组成的变化(无论是升职、降职还是新进入者)提出了一套理论预期,这些变化是由于精英离职而导致的。上任(或“精英洗牌”)并引进新的精英。我们测试了从现有关于独裁统治精英管理的文献中得出的一些理论预期,然后使用 1948 年至 2017 年间 351 名朝鲜精英成员的面板数据集来检验这些预期。考虑到领导特征、对政权的威胁(内部和外部)、外部机会和结构性因素,我们发现对朝鲜精英流失的解释非常具体,在金正恩的领导下比他的前任更明显。这表明金正恩的地位比他父亲和祖父的地位要脆弱得多,而且很可能会继续如此。
更新日期:2020-06-01
中文翻译:
威权生存策略和精英流失:以朝鲜为例
独裁者如何与专制精英互动?这是一个在过去十年中越来越受到学术关注的问题。在本文中,我们以朝鲜为例,对“精英流失”或精英组成的变化(无论是升职、降职还是新进入者)提出了一套理论预期,这些变化是由于精英离职而导致的。上任(或“精英洗牌”)并引进新的精英。我们测试了从现有关于独裁统治精英管理的文献中得出的一些理论预期,然后使用 1948 年至 2017 年间 351 名朝鲜精英成员的面板数据集来检验这些预期。考虑到领导特征、对政权的威胁(内部和外部)、外部机会和结构性因素,我们发现对朝鲜精英流失的解释非常具体,在金正恩的领导下比他的前任更明显。这表明金正恩的地位比他父亲和祖父的地位要脆弱得多,而且很可能会继续如此。