Daniel C. Dennett has long maintained that the Consequence Argument for incompatibilism is confused. In a joint work with Christopher Taylor, he claims to have shown that the argument is based on a failure to understand Logic 101. Given a fairly plausible account of having the power to cause something, they claim that an inference rule that the argument relies on is invalid. In this paper, I show that Dennett and Taylor’s refutation does not work against a better, more standard version of the Consequence Argument. Hence Dennett and Taylor’s alleged refutation fails.

中文翻译：

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Dennett 和 Taylor 所谓的对后果论证的反驳

Daniel C. Dennett 长期以来一直认为不相容的后果论证是混乱的。在与克里斯托弗·泰勒 (Christopher Taylor) 的合作中，他声称已证明该论证是基于未能理解 Logic 101。鉴于对具有引起某事的能力的相当合理的解释，他们声称该论证所依赖的推理规则是无效的。在这篇论文中，我展示了 Dennett 和 Taylor 的反驳对结果论证的更好、更标准的版本并不适用。因此，丹尼特和泰勒所谓的反驳失败了。