This paper is interested in the critical potential of the idea of original common possession of the Earth. On the basis of a comparative analysis of Hugo Grotius and Immanuel Kant, it shows how different the meaning of this idea can be within a theory of property or territory. The first part is devoted to Grotius’s account of why and how the institution of property was progressively introduced. It highlights the importance this account attaches to the intention of the first distributors for a good understanding of property laws, and in particular, for an understanding of their non-application in situations of extreme necessity. The second part takes the opposite path and shows that although Kant rejects the very existence of a right of necessity, the idea that one might be liberated from a law is not completely absent from, and even plays a crucial role in, his account of property. Clarification of this role ultimately leads us back to the idea of original possession in common of the Earth.

中文翻译：

---

格劳秀斯和康德关于商品和财产的原始共同体

本文对地球原始共同拥有这一想法的关键潜力感兴趣。在对 Hugo Grotius 和 Immanuel Kant 的比较分析的基础上，它显示了这个想法在财产或领土理论中的含义是多么不同。第一部分专门讨论格劳秀斯对财产制度为何以及如何逐步引入的说明。它强调了该帐户对第一批分销商意图的重要性，以便更好地理解财产法，特别是理解它们在极端必要的情况下不适用。第二部分走相反的道路，表明尽管康德拒绝必然权利的存在，但并非完全没有人们可以从法律中解放出来的想法，甚至在他对财产的描述中起着至关重要的作用。对这一角色的澄清最终将我们带回到地球最初共有的概念。