Recent contributions on ‘financial repression’ and ‘money illusion’ have referred to Maynard Keynes's How to Pay for the War as a supporting document. This article discusses whether Keynes prescribed policies of ‘financial repression’ that were implemented in the United Kingdom, and other countries, following World War II. It seems reasonable that Keynes's writings were instrumental in translating British monetary experiences of the 1920s and 1930s into expectations of policymakers during and after World War II, including a belief in ‘money illusion’ that suggested the use of inflation for driving down real interest rates of public bonds. If this was the case, How to Pay for the War could indeed provide an important explanation for the why and when of ‘financial repression’. This article argues that How to Pay for the War only partly provided support for a policy of ‘financial repression’, and none for using inflation as a ‘tax gatherer’ to the detriment of domestic savers in general. Crediting Keynes as a source for widespread ‘money illusion’ is also out of line with the historical record.

中文翻译：

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凯恩斯、通货膨胀和公共债务：作为金融抑制的政策处方，如何为战争买单？

最近关于“金融抑制”和“金钱幻觉”的文章提到了梅纳德凯恩斯的如何支付战争费用作为证明文件。本文讨论凯恩斯是否规定了二战后在英国和其他国家实施的“金融压制”政策。凯恩斯的著作有助于将 1920 年代和 1930 年代的英国货币经验转化为二战期间和之后政策制定者的预期，这似乎是合理的，包括对“货币幻觉”的信念，即暗示使用通货膨胀来压低实际利率公共债券。如果是这样的话，如何支付战争费用确实可以为“金融抑制”的原因和时间提供重要的解释。这篇文章认为如何支付战争费用只是部分地支持了“金融抑制”政策，而没有支持将通货膨胀作为“税收收集者”来损害一般国内储户的利益。将凯恩斯视为广泛存在的“金钱幻觉”的根源也与历史记录不符。