In spite of considerable attention granted to sovereign debt failures, we still have limited knowledge of the incentives which induced creditors to lend at unsustainable levels. This article looks at the French government’s policy towards Poland from 1958, when economic cooperation between the two countries started, until Poland's announcement in 1981 that it could not service its debt. Export credit guarantees supported France's financial involvement, and this implied the government's strong influence on the decision to lend. This article brings out the tension between economic and political priorities in French policymaking during the cold war. Archival evidence reveals that as early as 1975 the French finance ministry warned that French risks were excessive; that Poland’s growing economic difficulties would render the country unable to repay its debts; and recommended limiting France's financial commitments. The French government, however, decided not only to carry on but also to increase lending, in order to support its political objective of using economic and financial means to relax East–West tensions. This article illustrates how creditors play a part in sovereign debt crises by voluntarily turning a blind eye to a country’s growing inability to repay its debts, and thus reinforce a vicious circle of indebtedness.

中文翻译：

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债权人在债务危机中的作用：法国政府对波兰的财政支持，介于冷战利益和经济约束之间，1958-1981

尽管对主权债务失败给予了相当多的关注，但我们对诱使债权人以不可持续水平放贷的动机仍然知之甚少。本文着眼于法国政府从 1958 年两国开始经济合作到 1981 年波兰宣布无法偿还债务的对波兰政策。出口信用担保支持了法国的金融参与，这意味着政府对贷款决定的强大影响力。本文提出了冷战期间法国政策制定中经济和政治优先事项之间的紧张关系。档案证据显示，早在 1975 年，法国财政部就警告法国风险过大；波兰日益严重的经济困难将导致该国无法偿还债务；并建议限制法国的财政承诺。然而，法国政府决定不仅继续而且增加贷款，以支持其利用经济和金融手段缓解东西方紧张局势的政治目标。本文说明债权人如何在主权债务危机中发挥作用，自愿对一个国家越来越无力偿还债务视而不见，从而加剧了债务的恶性循环。