At present, most scholarship on the potential for escalation in cyberspace couches analysis in terms of the technological dynamics of the domain for relative power maneuvering. The result has been a conceptualisation of the logic of operation in cyberspace as one of ‘tit-for-tat’ exchanges motivated by attribution problems and limited opportunity for strategic gain. This article argues that this dominant perspective overlooks alternative notions of how cyber tools are used to influence. This, in turn, has largely led scholars to ignore second-order effects – meaning follow-on effects triggered by a more direct outcome of an initial cyber action – on domestic conditions, institutions, and individual stakeholders. This article uses the case of cyber-enabled political warfare targeting the United States in 2016 to show how escalation can occur as a second-order effect of cyber operations. Specifically, the episode led to a re-evaluation of foreign cyber strategy on the part of American defence thinkers that motivated an offensive shift in doctrine by 2018. The episode also directly affected both the political positions taken by important domestic actors and the attitude of parts of the electorate towards interference, both of which have reinforced the commitment of military planners towards assertive cyber actions.

中文翻译：

---

超越网络空间的针锋相对：政治战和在线升级的横向来源

目前，大多数关于网络空间升级潜力的学术研究都针对相对权力操纵领域的技术动态进行分析。其结果是将网络空间中的操作逻辑概念化为一种“以牙还牙”的交流，其动机是归因问题和有限的战略收益机会。本文认为，这种占主导地位的观点忽略了有关如何使用网络工具进行影响的替代概念。反过来，这在很大程度上导致学者们忽视了对国内条件、机构和个人利益相关者的二阶效应——即由初始网络行动的更直接结果引发的后续效应。本文使用 2016 年针对美国的网络政治战案例来展示升级如何作为网络行动的二级效应发生。具体来说，这一事件导致美国国防思想家重新评估了外国网络战略，从而在 2018 年之前推动了学说的进攻性转变。这一事件还直接影响了国内重要参与者的政治立场和部分国家的态度。选民反对干预，这两者都加强了军事规划者对自信的网络行动的承诺。