This essay defends subjectivism about reasons of love. These are the normative reasons we have to treat those we love especially well, such as the reasons we have to treat our close friends or life partners better than strangers. Subjectivism about reasons of love is the view that every reason of love a person has is correctly explained by her desires. I formulate a version of subjectivism about reasons of love and defend it against three objections that have been made to this kind of view. Firstly, it has been argued that the phenomenology of our focus when we have reasons of love does not fit with subjectivism about those reasons. Secondly, it has been argued that the phenomenology of our motivations when we have reasons of love does not fit with subjectivism about those reasons. Thirdly, it has been argued that subjectivism about reasons of love has deeply counterintuitive implications about what our reasons of love are. I argue that none of these objections succeeds.

中文翻译：

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爱、理由和欲望

这篇文章为关于爱的理由的主观主义辩护。这些是我们必须特别善待我们所爱的人的规范原因，例如我们必须比陌生人更好地对待我们的亲密朋友或生活伴侣的原因。关于爱的理由的主观主义认为，一个人的每一个爱的理由都可以由她的欲望正确解释。我阐述了一个关于爱的理由的主观主义版本，并针对针对这种观点的三个反对意见进行辩护。首先，有人认为，当我们有爱的理由时，我们关注的现象学与关于这些理由的主观主义不符。其次，有人认为，当我们有爱的理由时，我们动机的现象学与关于这些理由的主观主义不符。第三，有人认为，关于爱的理由的主观主义对于我们的爱的理由是什么有着深刻的违反直觉的暗示。我认为这些反对意见都没有成功。