The literature on epistemic injustice currently displays a logocentric or propositional bias that excludes people with intellectual disabilities from the scope of epistemic agency and the demands of epistemic justice. This paper develops an account of epistemic agency and injustice that is inclusive of both people with and people without intellectual disabilities. I begin by specifying the hitherto undertheorized notion of epistemic agency. I develop a broader, pluralist account of epistemic agency, which relies on a conception of knowledge that accounts not only for propositional knowing, but also for other types of knowing that have been largely neglected in debates on epistemic injustice and agency. Based on this pluralist account of epistemic agency, I then show that people with intellectual disabilities qualify as epistemic agents and therefore as subjects of epistemic justice. Finally, I argue that this pluralist account of epistemic agency pushes us to revisit the current conception of epistemic injustice and to expand its taxonomy in two important ways.

中文翻译：

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元认知不公正和智力障碍：认知能动性的多元解释

目前关于认知不公正的文献显示出一种以逻辑为中心或命题的偏见，将智障人士排除在认知能动性的范围和认知正义的要求之外。本文对认知能动性和不公正进行了解释，包括智障人士和非智障人士。我首先详细说明了迄今为止理论不足的认知能动性概念。我开发了一个更广泛的、多元的认知能动性解释，它依赖于一种知识概念，该概念不仅解释了命题认识，而且解释了在关于认识论不公正和能动性的辩论中很大程度上被忽视的其他类型的认识。基于这种对认知能动性的多元解释，然后，我表明智障人士有资格成为认知主体，因此也有资格成为认知正义的主体。最后，我认为这种对认知能动性的多元解释促使我们重新审视当前的认知不公正概念，并以两个重要的方式扩展其分类。