Agent-based virtue ethical theories must deal with the problem of right action: if an action is right just in case it expresses a virtuous motive, then how can an agent perform the right action but for the wrong reason, or from a vicious motive? Some recent agent-based accounts purport to answer this challenge and two other related problems. Here I assess these accounts and show them to be inadequate answers to the problem of right action (and one of the other problems for agent-basing). Overall, it is shown that the most recent and promising attempts at squaring agent-based virtue ethics with commonsense morality are flawed, and so, the case for agent-basing in general that much dimmer.

中文翻译：

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评估最近基于代理的正确行动帐户（及更多）

基于代理的美德伦理理论必须处理正确行为的问题：如果一个行为是正确的，只是为了表达善意的动机，那么代理如何执行正确的行为，但出于错误的原因，或者出于恶意动机？最近一些基于代理的帐户旨在回答这一挑战和其他两个相关问题。在这里，我评估了这些说明，并表明它们对于正确行动的问题（以及基于代理的其他问题之一）来说是不充分的答案。总的来说，它表明，最近和有希望的尝试将基于代理的美德伦理与常识道德相提并论是有缺陷的，因此，基于代理的总体情况要暗淡得多。