In this paper, I offer a novel defense of moderate pessimism about moral deference, i.e., the view that we have pro tanto reason to avoid moral deference. I argue that moral deference fails to give us the epistemic credentials to satisfy plausible norms of moral assertion. I then argue that moral assertions made solely on the basis of deferential moral beliefs violate a plausible epistemic and moral norm against withholding information that one knows, has evidence, or ought to believe will importantly affect another person’s deliberation. Finally, I argue that not only does moral deference fail to put the audience in a good epistemic position it also puts the audience in a bad epistemic and moral position. First, there is a tight connection between outright believing something and being disposed to assert it and so deferential moral beliefs often motivate people to assert something that they don’t have the epistemic credentials to properly assertion. Second, there will often be moral reasons to make assertions—even based on deferential moral beliefs. These assertions, while all-things-considered permissible, will be epistemic impermissible and involve violating a moral norm.

中文翻译：

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道德尊重、道德主张和语用学

在本文中，我为关于道德顺从的温和悲观主义提供了一种新颖的辩护，即我们有避免道德顺从的充分理由的观点。我认为，道德上的尊重未能给我们提供满足道德断言的合理规范的认知凭据。然后我争辩说，仅仅基于恭顺的道德信念而做出的道德断言违反了一个似是而非的认知和道德规范，反对隐瞒一个人知道、有证据或应该相信会严重影响另一个人的审议的信息。最后，我认为，道德上的尊重不仅不能将观众置于良好的认知位置，而且还会使观众处于不良的认知和道德位置。第一的，完全相信某事和倾向于断言它之间存在紧密联系，因此恭敬的道德信念常常促使人们断言他们没有正确断言的认知凭据。其次，做出断言往往有道德理由——即使是基于恭顺的道德信念。这些断言虽然被认为是允许的，但在认知上是不允许的，并且涉及违反道德规范。