This paper argues that suspension of judgement is the appropriate response to disagreement about ultimate moral principles, and outlines the implications of such a response. It begins with an argument influenced by Sextus and Sidgwick for the rationality of suspension, and then illustrates fundamental disagreement with the case of promising. Replies are offered to the arguments against the rationality of suspension offered by Robert Audi in his discussion of moral perception. It is noted in particular that such rationality does not depend on the assumption that epistemic peerhood is widespread. The limited nature of ethical agreement is illustrated, along with the limited implications of disagreement if a less adversarial and more constructive ethical methodology is adopted.

中文翻译：

---

生活在道德分歧中

本文认为，暂停判断是对最终道德原则分歧的适当回应，并概述了这种回应的含义。它以受塞克斯图斯和西奇威克影响的关于暂停合理性的论点开始，然后说明了与有希望的情况的根本分歧。罗伯特·奥迪 (Robert Audi) 在讨论道德感知时提出的反对暂停的合理性的论点提供了答复。特别要注意的是，这种合理性并不依赖于认知同等地位普遍存在的假设。如果采用较少对抗性和更具建设性的道德方法，则说明了道德同意的有限性质，以及分歧的有限影响。