Moral judgments entail or consist in claims that certain ways of behaving are called for. These actions have expectable consequences. I will argue that these consequences are suspiciously benign: on controversial issues, each side assesses these consequences, measured in dispute-independent goods, as significantly better than the consequences of behaving in the ways their opponents recommend. This remains the case even when we have not formed our moral judgment by assessing consequences. I will suggest that the evidence indicates that our perception of the consequences of acting as recommended by our moral judgments is motivated, such that the warrant of such assessments is lower than we might have thought. The suspicion correlation between our moral judgments and our assessments of the implicated facts provides higher-order evidence that should lead us to reduce our confidence in these assessments.

中文翻译：

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可疑方便的信念

道德判断包含或包含要求某些行为方式的主张。这些行动产生了预期的后果。我会争辩说，这些后果可疑地是良性的：在有争议的问题上，每一方都评估这些后果，以与争议无关的物品来衡量，远远好于按照对手推荐的方式行事的后果。即使我们没有通过评估后果来形成我们的道德判断，情况仍然如此。我认为证据表明，我们对道德判断所建议的行为后果的看法是有动机的，因此此类评估的依据低于我们的想象。