There is much of interest in Cassam’s ground-breaking Vices of the Mind (2019). This discussion focuses exclusively on one aspect of his view, namely, his account of what it takes to be properly criticisable or blameworthy for one’s epistemic vices. This critical discussion consists of two sections. The first provides an overview of Cassam’s account of responsibility and criticisability for intellectual vices. The second raises a problem for that account whose formulation is due to Battaly ( 2019 ) and proposes a solution which, at least in part, could also be adopted by Cassam himself if he were prepared to make some small changes to his view. This solution generates a highly disjunctive account of criticisability and responsibility for possessing an epistemic vice. Although such heterogeneity might seem wholly unsatisfactory, it receives a plausible explanation when the account is put within the context of a Strawsonian approach to the practice of holding people responsible for their epistemic vices.

中文翻译：

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责备智力上的恶毒：对卡萨姆关于认知罪恶的应受谴责和应受谴责的批判性讨论

人们对卡萨姆开创性的《心灵的恶习》（2019 年）很感兴趣。这个讨论只集中在他观点的一个方面，即他对一个人的认知恶习需要适当批评或应受谴责的条件的解释。本次批判性讨论由两部分组成。第一个概述了卡萨姆对知识恶习的责任和可批评性的描述。第二个提出了一个问题，其表述是由于 Battaly (2019) 提出的，并提出了一个解决方案，如果卡萨姆准备对他的观点进行一些小的改变，至少部分地，卡萨姆本人也可以采用该解决方案。这个解决方案产生了对拥有认知恶习的可批评性和责任的高度分离的描述。虽然这种异质性似乎完全不能令人满意，