This paper proposes a new interpretation of non-cooperative games that shows why the unilateralism of best-reply reasoning fails to capture the mutuality of strategic interdependence. Drawing on an intersubjective approach to theorizing individual agency in shared context, including a non-individualistic model of common belief without infinite regress, the paper develops a general model of a 2 × 2 simultaneous one-shot non-cooperative game and applies it to games including Hi-Lo, Stag Hunt, Prisoners’ Dilemma, Chicken, BoS and Matching Pennies. Results include High as the rational choice in Hi-Lo, and Cooperate as a possible rational choice in the Prisoners’ Dilemma.

中文翻译：

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博弈论的主体间代理模型

本文提出了一种对非合作博弈的新解释，它说明了为什么最佳回答推理的单边主义未能捕捉到战略相互依存的相互性。画在一个主体间在共享上下文中对个体代理进行理论化的方法，包括没有无限回归的共同信念的非个人主义模型，本文开发了一个 2 × 2 同步一次性非合作博弈的一般模型，并将其应用于包括 Hi-Lo 在内的游戏、猎鹿、囚徒困境、鸡、BoS 和匹配便士。结果包括高的作为 Hi-Lo 中的理性选择，并且合作作为囚徒困境中一个可能的理性选择。