This article responds to two arguments against ‘Epistemic Perceptualism’, the view that emotional experiences, as involving a perception of value, can constitute reasons for evaluative belief. It first provides a basic account of emotional experience (section 2), and then introduces concepts relevant to the epistemology of emotional experience, such as the nature of a reason for belief, non-inferentiality, and prima facie vs. conclusive reasons, which allow for the clarification of Epistemic Perceptualism in terms of the Perceptual Justificatory View (section 3). It then challenges two arguments which purport to show that emotional experience is not a source of reasons for evaluative belief (sections 4, 5 and 6). The first argument claims that because normative why-questions are always appropriate in the case of emotions, then emotions can never be conclusive reasons for corresponding evaluative beliefs. The second purports to show that appeal to emotional experience as a source of reasons for evaluative beliefs renders emotions problematically self-justifying, and since emotions cannot be (even provisionally) self-justifying, they cannot provide any sort of reason for corresponding evaluative beliefs. This article responds to these arguments, and in doing so shows there is still much to be learned about the epistemology of emotional experience by drawing analogies with perceptual experience.

中文翻译：

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情感体验的认识论

本文回应了反对“认知感知主义”的两个论点，即情感体验作为涉及价值感知的观点，可以构成评价性信念的理由。它首先提供了情感体验的基本说明（第 2 部分），然后介绍了与情感体验认识论相关的概念，例如信念原因的性质、非推理性以及初步证据与非推理性。结论性理由，允许根据感知正当性观点（第 3 节）澄清认知感知主义。然后，它挑战了两个旨在表明情感体验不是评价性信念的原因来源的论点（第 4、5 和 6 节）。第一个论点声称，因为规范的为什么问题总是适用于情绪的情况，那么情绪永远不能成为相应评价信念的决定性理由。第二个目的是表明，诉诸情感体验作为评价信念的理由来源会使情绪有问题地自我辩护，并且由于情感不能（甚至暂时）自我辩护，因此它们不能为相应的评价信念提供任何类型的理由。这篇文章回应了这些论点，这样做表明，通过与感知经验进行类比，关于情感体验的认识论还有很多需要学习的地方。并且由于情绪不能（甚至暂时）自我证明，它们不能为相应的评价信念提供任何类型的理由。这篇文章回应了这些论点，这样做表明，通过与感知经验进行类比，关于情感体验的认识论还有很多需要学习的地方。并且由于情绪不能（甚至暂时）自我证明，它们不能为相应的评价信念提供任何类型的理由。这篇文章回应了这些论点，这样做表明，通过与感知经验进行类比，关于情感体验的认识论还有很多需要学习的地方。