A theory of normative reasons for action faces the fundamental challenge of accounting for the dual nature of reasons. On the one hand, some reasons appear to depend on, and vary with, desires. On the other hand, some reasons appear categorical in the sense of being desire-independent. However, it has turned out to be difficult to provide a theory that accommodates both these aspects. Internalism is able account for the former aspect, but has difficulties to account for the latter, whereas externalism is vulnerable to the reverse problem. In this paper, I outline an ecumenical view that consists of two parts: First, I defend a distinction between requiring reasons and justifying reasons in terms of their different connections to rationality. Second, I put forward a subjectivist, procedural, view of rationality. The ecumenical alternative, I argue, is able to accommodate the mentioned duality within a unified theory. In outlining this view, I also suggest that it has a number of other significant advantages.

中文翻译：

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走向规范理由的普世理论

行动的规范理由理论面临着解释理由的双重性质的根本挑战。一方面，某些原因似乎取决于欲望并随欲望而变化。另一方面，某些原因在与欲望无关的意义上显得是绝对的。然而，事实证明，提供一种兼顾这两个方面的理论是很困难的。内在主义可以解释前者，但很难解释后者，而外在主义则容易受到相反的问题的影响。在这篇论文中，我概述了一个由两部分组成的普世观点：首先，我捍卫要求理由和正当理由之间的区别，因为它们与理性的不同联系。其次，我提出了一种主观的、程序的、理性的观点。我认为，普世的替代方案，能够在统一理论中容纳上述二元性。在概述这一观点时，我还建议它具有许多其他显着优势。