Proponents of corporate moral responsibility have provided a number of accounts of moral collective agency. But these accounts do not shed light on how a collective agent might fail to be a moral agent. I explain the difference between moral and amoral collective agents in terms of the notion of a normative perspective. I argue that, in order for a collective agent to be a moral agent, it has to have a normative perspective that is suitably supported by its members. I develop this idea both from a rationalist and from a sentimentalist point of view. According to the rationalist proposal, the members have to collective accept the normative perspective. The sentimentalist proposal also requires that it be suitably supported by collective member emotions. These simulate the epistemic and volitional roles that genuine corporate emotions would play. The upshot is that an amoral collective agent either lacks a normative perspective altogether, or that its normative perspective is not suitably supported by its members.

中文翻译：

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集体代理：道德和非道德

企业道德责任的支持者提供了许多关于道德集体代理的说明。但这些描述并没有说明集体行动者如何可能无法成为道德行动者。我根据规范视角的概念来解释道德和非道德集体代理人之间的区别。我认为，为了使集体行动者成为道德行动者，它必须有一个得到其成员适当支持的规范观点。我从理性主义者和感伤主义者的角度发展了这个想法。根据理性主义的提议，成员必须集体接受规范的观点。多愁善感的提议还要求它得到集体成员情绪的适当支持。这些模拟了真正的企业情感将扮演的认知和意志角色。