Allan Gibbard (2012) argues that the term ‘meaning’ expresses a normative concept, primarily on the basis of arguments that parallel Moore's famous Open Question Argument. In this paper I argue that Gibbard's evidence for normativity rests on idiosyncrasies of the Open Question Argument, and that when we use related thought experiments designed to bring out unusual semantic intuitions associated with normative terms we fail to find such evidence. These thought experiments, moreover, strongly suggest there are basic requirements for a theory of meaning incompatible with Gibbard's ultimate goal of providing an expressivist account of meaning-related concepts. I conclude by considering a possible way in which meaning could be normative, consistent with the intuitions about disagreement; but this form of normativism about meaning appears incompatible with Gibbard's expressivism.

中文翻译：

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关于分歧的直觉不支持意义的规范性

Allan Gibbard (2012) 认为术语“意义”表达了一个规范性概念，主要是基于与摩尔著名的开放问题论点平行的论点。在这篇论文中，我认为 Gibbard 的规范性证据依赖于开放问题论证的特质，并且当我们使用相关的思想实验来揭示与规范性术语相关的不寻常的语义直觉时，我们无法找到这样的证据。此外，这些思想实验强烈表明，意义理论存在一些基本要求，这与吉巴德的最终目标不相容，即提供对意义相关概念的表现主义解释。最后，我考虑了一种使意义成为规范的可能方式，与关于分歧的直觉相一致；