Two general principles have played a crucial role in the recent debate on concepts. On the one hand, we want to allow different subjects to have the same concepts, thus accounting for concept publicity: concepts are ‘the sort of thing that people can, and do, share’. On the other hand, a subject who finds herself in a so-called ‘Frege case’ appears to have different concepts for the same object: for instance, Lois Lane has two distinct concepts SUPERMAN and CLARK KENT which refer to the same person (Superman/Clark). Several theories have tried to meet both of these constraints at the same time. But should we really try to satisfy both principles? This paper will argue that the traditional project of fulfilling these two constraints has been a misguided one. Through a variation on classic identity mistake cases, I will show that our two desiderata are inconsistent: it would thus be impossible to incorporate both of them in our best theory of concepts.

中文翻译：

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概念论的两个约束

在最近关于概念的辩论中，有两个一般原则发挥了关键作用。一方面，我们希望让不同的主体拥有相同的概念，从而实现概念宣传：概念是“人们可以并且可以共享的那种东西”。另一方面，发现自己处于所谓“弗雷格案”中的主体似乎对同一对象具有不同的概念：例如，Lois Lane 有两个不同的概念 SUPERMAN 和 CLARK KENT，它们指的是同一个人（超人/克拉克）。有几种理论试图同时满足这两个约束。但我们真的应该努力同时满足这两个原则吗？本文将争辩说，满足这两个约束的传统项目是一个被误导的项目。通过经典身份错误案例的变体，