In recent literature, there is a strong tendency to endorse the following argument: There are particular judgments about one's current phenomenal experiences that are infallible; if there are particular judgments about one's current phenomenal experiences that are infallible, then the infallibility of those judgments is due to the relation of acquaintance; therefore, acquaintance explains why those particular judgments about one's current phenomenal experiences are infallible. The aim of this paper is to examine critically both the first and the second premise of this argument. It will emerge that there might be a small class of judgments about one's current phenomenal experiences that are infallible, namely judgments involving direct phenomenal concepts. However, as I will try to show, the infallibility of such judgments, if existent at all, is not due to the relation of acquaintance.

中文翻译：

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无误性、熟识和现象概念

在最近的文献中，有一种强烈的倾向支持以下论点： 对一个人当前的现象经验有绝对可靠的特定判断；如果对一个人当前的现象经验有绝对正确的判断，那么这些判断的正确性是由于熟人关系；因此，熟人解释了为什么对一个人当前的现象经历做出的那些特定判断是绝对正确的。本文的目的是批判性地检验这个论证的第一个和第二个前提。将会出现关于一个人当前的现象经验的一小类判断是无误的，即涉及直接现象概念的判断。然而，正如我将试图表明的，这种判断的绝对正确性，