What accounts for the linkage of seemingly diverse and inherently separable fundamental properties, such that they are regarded as properties of a single thing? Multiple answers to this question have been put forward in both the historical and current literature, especially from competing substance ontologies and competing theories concerning the metaphysics of natural kinds. Here I lay out and critically assess two ways in which dispositionalism might contribute to the discussion.

中文翻译：

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自然本质主义、实体本体论和统一问题：两种倾向性解决方案

是什么解释了看似多样且本质上可分离的基本属性之间的联系，以至于它们被视为单一事物的属性？历史文献和当前文献中都对这个问题提出了多种答案，特别是来自关于自然类形而上学的竞争实体本体论和竞争理论。在这里，我列出并批判性地评估了性格论可能有助于讨论的两种方式。