It is well known that Frege was an extensionalist, in the following sense: he held that the truth-value of a sentence is always a function only of (its syntax and) the references (the “extensions”) of its parts. One consequence of this view is that expressions occurring in certain linguistic contexts—for example, the that-clauses of propositional attitude ascriptions— do not have their usual references, but refer instead to what are usually their senses. But although a number of philosophers have objected to this result, no one has yet attempted to see what happens to Frege’s views—and, in particular, to his theory of sense and reference—if his extensionalism is abandoned while his other views are (so far as possible) maintained. This paper thus does two things. First, it clears the way for such an attempt, by arguing that recent defenses of Frege’s extensionalism—by Tyler Burge, Saul Kripke, Terence Parsons, and Christopher Peacocke—fall short. Second, it sketches a positive proposal for a non-extensionalist application of Frege’s theory of sense and reference to sentences of indirect discourse and ascriptions of propositional attitude. Extensionality, Indirect Contexts, and Frege’s Hierarchy 1

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外延性、间接上下文和弗雷格的层次结构

众所周知，弗雷格是一个外延论者，在以下意义上：他认为一个句子的真值始终只是它的部分（它的句法和）引用（“外延”）的函数。这种观点的一个后果是，出现在某些语言环境中的表达——例如，命题态度归因的 that 子句——没有它们通常的指称，而是指代它们通常具有的意义。但是，尽管许多哲学家反对这一结果，但还没有人试图了解弗雷格的观点——尤其是他的意义和指称理论——如果他的外延论被抛弃而他的其他观点被抛弃（所以尽可能）保持。因此，本文做了两件事。首先，它为这样的尝试扫清了道路，通过争辩说最近对弗雷格的外延主义的辩护——泰勒·伯格、索尔·克里普克、特伦斯·帕森斯和克里斯托弗·皮科克——是不够的。其次，它为弗雷格的意义理论的非外延主义应用以及间接话语的句子和命题态度的归因勾勒出一个积极的建议。外延性、间接上下文和弗雷格的层次结构 1