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I Would Do Anything for Law (and That’s a Problem): Criminalization, Value, and Motives
Criminal Law and Philosophy ( IF 0.7 ) Pub Date : 2019-12-04 , DOI: 10.1007/s11572-019-09520-w
Jens Damgaard Thaysen

It is widely accepted that (1) criminalization creates a prudential reason to refrain from the criminalized conduct in order to avoid punishment, and (2) prudence is the wrong reason to refrain from wrongdoing. According to Michael S. Moore, these facts should lead us to conclude that the criminalization of wrongful conduct corrupts motives by making some who would otherwise have refrained from wrongdoing for the right reason, refrain from wrongdoing only out of prudence. This paper argues that (1) and (2) provide no reason to believe that criminalization corrupts motives, but should instead lead us to conclude that the criminalization of wrongful conduct obscures motives by making it harder to identify those who refrain from wrongdoing for the right reason. The paper then goes on to argue that the badness of obscuring motives is a pro tanto reason against criminalizing wrongdoing.

中文翻译:

我会为法律做任何事情(这是一个问题):刑事定罪,价值和动机

众所周知,(1)刑事定罪是为了避免受到惩罚而避免犯罪行为的审慎理由,(2)谨慎是避免违法的错误理由。迈克尔·摩尔认为,这些事实可以使我们得出结论,将不法行为定为刑事犯罪会破坏动机,使一些原本会出于正当理由而避免做错事的人,仅出于审慎而避免做错事。本文认为,(1)和(2)没有理由相信犯罪化会破坏动机,而是应该使我们得出结论,对不法行为的刑事定罪掩盖了动机,因为这使人们更难于识别那些不为正当做错事的人。原因。
更新日期:2019-12-04
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