Risk is at the core of criminal recklessness, but its exact constitution comes into focus only in unusual cases. In rethinking criminal law, Larry Alexander and Kimberley Kessler Ferzan say that risk in criminal recklessness ought to be constituted by the subjective belief of the person whose action is being evaluated: the gravity of the harm risked and its probability of resulting is what the person believed it to be, not what it actually was. This means that recklessness can be found in the absence of any “real” risk. This article critiques the authors’ argument for subjective risk in recklessness. They exaggerate the arbitrariness in identifying risk non-subjectively and do not sufficiently acknowledge risk as an inter-subjectively constituted practical concept. Fixing risk subjectively, as advocated by the authors, nonetheless may appear useful for inchoate criminal liability. The article considers and rejects this idea of occasionally subjectivising risk in recklessness.

中文翻译：

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鲁Without无风险

风险是鲁ck行为的核心，但是其确切的构成仅在异常情况下才成为关注焦点。在重新思考刑法时，拉里·亚历山大（Larry Alexander）和金伯利·凯斯勒·费赞（Kimberley Kessler Ferzan）说，刑事鲁ck风险应由对其行为进行评估的人的主观信念构成：危害的严重性及其产生的可能性是该人所相信的而不是实际的样子。这意味着在没有任何“真实”风险的情况下会发现鲁re。本文批评了鲁the性中主观风险的作者论点。它们夸大了在非主观地识别风险方面的任意性，并且没有充分认识到风险是由主观间构成的实际概念。正如作者所主张的那样，主观地确定风险，但是，对于早期的刑事责任而言，这似乎很有用。本文考虑并拒绝了偶尔将鲁in风险主观化的想法。