We seem to be responsible for our beliefs in a distinctively epistemic way. We often hold each other to account for the beliefs that we hold. We do this by criticising other believers as ‘gullible’ or ‘biased’, and by trying to persuade others to revise their beliefs. But responsibility for belief looks hard to understand because we seem to lack control over our beliefs. In this paper, I argue that we can make progress in our understanding of responsibility for belief by thinking about it in parallel with another kind of responsibility: legal responsibility for criminal negligence. Specifically, I argue that that a popular account of responsibility for belief, which grounds it in belief’s reasons-responsiveness, faces a problem analogous to one faced by H.L.A. Hart’s influential capacity-based account of culpability. This points towards a more promising account of responsibility of belief, though, if we draw on accounts of negligence that improve on Hart’s. Broadly speaking, the account of negligence that improves on Hart’s account grounds culpability in a (lack of) concern for others’ interests, whereas my account of epistemic responsibility grounds responsibility for belief in a (lack of) concern for the truth.

中文翻译：

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认知责任与刑事过失

我们似乎以一种独特的认知方式对我们的信念负责。我们经常互相抱着，以解释我们所持有的信念。为此，我们批评其他信徒“易受骗”或“偏见”，并试图说服他人修改其信仰。但是信念责任似乎很难理解，因为我们似乎对信念缺乏控制。在本文中，我认为我们可以通过与另一种责任（刑事过失的法律责任）同时思考来对信仰责任进行理解。具体来说，我认为，基于信念的原因-响应性而建立的一种普遍的信念责任说明面临着一个与HLA Hart基于影响力的基于罪责的有力说明所面临的类似问题。但是，如果我们借鉴对Hart有所改善的疏忽的说法，这将指向一个更有希望的信念责任说明。广义上讲，基于哈特的说法而过失的说法基于对他人利益（缺乏）关注的罪魁祸首，而我对认知责任的论述基于对真理的（缺乏）关注的信念承担责任。