The Prima facie view regarding the admissibility of admissions, as evidence, in criminal matters is that, to admit admissions as evidence, the court requires a single consideration as to whether the admission was made freely and voluntarily. Without too much ado, the simple view to this understanding presupposes that admission of an admission as evidence against its maker is of a lesser danger compared to the admission of a confession. The admissibility of confessions against their makers does not come as easily as that of admissions. There are many prescribed requirements to satisfy before confessions are admitted as evidence. This comparison has led to a questionable conclusion that requirements for the admissibility of admissions are of a less complexity equated to the requirements for the admission of confessions. This paper answers the question whether an inference that the requirements for the admissibility of admissions are of a less complexity compared to the requirements for the admission of confessions is rational? It equates this approach to the now done away with commonwealth states rigid differentiation perspective. In the 1800s the commonwealth states, especially those vowing on the Wigmorian perspective on the law of evidence, developed from a rigid interpretation of confessions and admissions and adopted a relaxed and wide definitions of the word, “confession.” To this extent there was a relaxed divide between confessions and admissions hence their common classification and application of similar cautionary rules. The article recounts admissibility requirement in section 219A of the South African Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 (CPA) (Hereinafter CPA). It then analyses Section 219A of the CPA requirement in the light of the rationale encompassing precautions for the admission of confessions in terms of 217(1) of the CPA. It exposes the similarities of potential prejudices where confessions and admissions are admitted as evidence. It reckons that by the adherence to this rigid differentiation perspectives of confessions and admissions which used to be the practice in the commonwealth prior the 1800s developments, South African law of evidence remains prejudicial to accused persons. To do away with these prejudices this article, recommends that section 219A be amended to include additional admissibility requirements in section 217(1). In effect it recommends the merging of sections 217(1) and 219A of the CPA.

中文翻译：

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1977 年第 51 号南非刑事诉讼法第 219A 节中对录取的必要预防措施的低估的危险

在刑事案件中，关于承认作为证据的可采性的初步观点是，为了承认承认作为证据，法院需要一个单一的考虑，即承认是否是自由和自愿的。不用多说，这种理解的简单观点的前提是，与承认供词相比，承认承认作为对其制造者不利的证据的危险较小。对他们的制造者的供词的可受理性并不像承认那样容易。在承认作为证据之前，有许多规定的要求需要满足。这种比较导致了一个有问题的结论，即承认可接纳性的要求与承认供述的要求一样复杂。本文回答了这样一个问题，即关于认罪的要求比认罪的要求复杂度较低的推论是否合理？它将这种方法等同于现在废除了英联邦国家僵化的分化观点。在 1800 年代，英联邦国家，尤其是那些宣誓采用 Wigmorian 证据法观点的国家，从对供词和承认的严格解释发展而来，对“供词”一词采用了宽松而宽泛的定义。就此而言，认罪和认罪之间存在着宽松的界限，因此它们的共同分类和类似警示规则的应用。该文章叙述了 1977 年南非刑事诉讼法第 51 号 (CPA)（以下简称 CPA）第 219A 节中的可受理性要求。然后根据《注册会计师》第 217(1) 条规定的关于承认供认的预防措施的基本原理，分析《注册会计师》要求的第 219A 条。它揭示了承认和承认作为证据的潜在偏见的相似之处。它认为，由于在 1800 年代发展之前的英联邦中一直坚持这种严格的供词和认罪的区分观点，南非的证据法仍然对被告不利。为了消除这些偏见，本文建议修改第 219A 条，以在第 217(1) 条中包含额外的可受理性要求。