I advance a phenomenology of forgetting based on Husserl’s accounts of time-consciousness and passive synthesis. This theory of forgetting is crucial for understanding the transcendental constitution of the past. I argue that without forgetting, neither memory nor retention suffice for a consciousness of the past as past, since both are irreducibly connected to the Living Present. After an initial survey of the challenges that confront a phenomenology of forgetting (i.e. the “forgotten” is defined by its lack of phenomenality), I provide a descriptive analysis of forgetting as a complex process that integrates an accomplishment of retention that Husserl called “temporal contraction” with an accomplishment of passive synthesis that Husserl called “affective fusion.” Temporal contraction is the accomplishment that creates a qualitative (not quantitative) distinction between near-retentions and far-retentions. Affective fusion enables us to provide a positive (not privative) phenomenological description of the withdrawal of egoic investment in intentional experiences. Taken together, these two syntheses generate a double concealment in which consciousness both forgets its object and forgets that it has forgotten it, thereby constituting it as part of the truly absent past.

中文翻译：

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遗忘的行为：胡塞尔关于缺席过去的构成

我提出了一种基于胡塞尔对时间意识和被动综合的描述的遗忘现象学。这种遗忘理论对于理解过去的先验构成至关重要。我认为，在没有忘记的情况下，记忆和保留都不足以将过去作为过去的意识，因为两者都与活生生的现在有着不可简化的联系。在对遗忘现象学所面临的挑战（即“被遗忘”的定义是缺乏现象性）进行初步调查之后，我提供了关于遗忘作为一个复杂过程的描述性分析，该过程整合了胡塞尔称之为“时间收缩”与被动综合的成就，胡塞尔称之为“情感融合”。” 时间收缩是在近保留和远保留之间创建定性（而非定量）区别的成就。情感融合使我们能够对有意体验中的自我投资的撤回提供积极的（非剥夺的）现象学描述。综合起来，这两种综合产生了双重隐蔽，其中意识既忘记了它的对象，又忘记了它已经忘记了它，从而将其构成为真正缺席的过去的一部分。