Adorno’s intensive criticism of phenomenology is well known, his entire early period during the 1920s and 1930s being marked by various polemical engagements with Husserl. This engagement finds its peak during his work at his second dissertation project in Oxford, a dissertation that was supposed to systematicaly expose the antinomies of phenomenological thinking while particularly focusing on Husserl’s concept of “eidetic intuition” or “intuition of essences” (Wesensschau). The present paper will take this criticism as its starting point in focusing on two highly specific aspects of Adorno’s interpretation: the opposition between eidetic intuition and the traditional theories of abstraction and its relationship to genetic phenomenology. In light of this criticism I subsequently show: 1. that, in his later work, Adorno’s understanding of eidetic intuition undergoes a significant revaluation; 2. that he reappropriates key elements of the eidetic method in his own procedure of physiognomic analysis, and 3. that his account of physiognomics is relevant for addressing the aforementioned incongruities of phenomenological eidetics itself.

中文翻译：

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作为面相学的本质直觉：重新思考阿多诺的现象学遗产

阿多诺对现象学的强烈批评是众所周知的，他在 1920 年代和 1930 年代的整个早期阶段都以与胡塞尔的各种论战交锋为标志。这种参与在他在牛津的第二篇论文项目的工作中达到顶峰，该论文旨在系统地揭露现象学思维的二律背反，同时特别关注胡塞尔的“本质直觉”或“本质直觉”（Wesensschau）的概念。本文将以此批评为出发点，重点关注阿多诺解释的两个高度具体的方面：本质直觉与传统抽象理论之间的对立及其与发生现象学的关系。鉴于这种批评，我随后表明： 1. 在他后来的作品中，阿多诺对本质直觉的理解经历了重大的重估；2. 他在他自己的相貌分析程序中重新使用了本质方法的关键要素，以及 3. 他对相貌学的描述与解决上述现象学本质本身的不协调性有关。