This paper questions the ontological integrity of Dasein as Heidegger specifies Being in Being and Time. It does so with reference to the real-life, real-time realities of Being-in-the-world and Being-toward-Death, thus with entering into the world in the first place and with ensuing developmental realities anchored essentially in bodily change and movement and with ensuing knowledge of the world and of death. Basic Husserlian insights validate answers to Dasein’s ontological deficiencies, raising questions as to Heidegger’s reading of Husserl texts, for example, of a hereness in relation to a thereness in Dasein’s use of “equipment,” hence of Dasein’s “zero point of orientation” with respect to the world. The question of whether Dasein can be a Being-toward-death without Being-a-Body discloses additional insights into Dasein’s ontological deficiencies by clarifying the nature of physical and lived bodies and by drawing on Husserl’s descriptive analyses of Leib, the lived body. The paper ends by detailing an epistemological irony with respect to Heidegger’s subjective account of Dasein’s knowledge of Being-toward-death.

中文翻译：

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有生命的存在：海德格尔《存在与时间》中的存在探究

本文质疑此在的本体论完整性，因为海德格尔指定了存在与时间中的存在。它参考了在世和走向死亡的现实生活、实时现实，因此首先进入世界，随后发展的现实主要以身体变化为基础和运动以及随之而来的关于世界和死亡的知识。胡塞尔的基本见解验证了此在本体论缺陷的答案，提出了关于海德格尔对胡塞尔文本的阅读的问题，例如，此在使用“设备”中的在场与在场之间的关系，因此是此在的“零取向点”。致全世界。此在是否可以在没有身为身体的情况下成为向死的存在的问题，通过阐明物理和活体的本质，并借鉴胡塞尔对莱布（活体）的描述性分析，揭示了对此在的本体论缺陷的额外见解。这篇论文最后详细描述了关于海德格尔关于此在关于死亡的存在知识的主观描述的认识论讽刺。