After taking into consideration the most relevant criticisms questioning the capacity of the thinking “I” to grasp itself in a transparent and undistorting way, I will ask what remains of first-person authority with regard to one’s own identity. I argue that first-person authority is not to be abandoned, but rather reformulated in terms of public commitments that nobody else can take up in my place. After recovering the original meaning of Heidegger’s claim “one is what one does,” I turn to Arendt’s performative disclosure of the “who” through political initiative and suggest reading the requirement of public exposure as a model allowing for a better understanding of self-identification. In order to discern more clearly the shape of this new paradigm of self-identification, I draw on Ricoeur’s notion of self-attestation, Crowell’s analysis of our “being-answerable” and Larmore’s account of avowals in which we give ourselves a publicly binding shape. In synthetizing and prolonging the considerations of the abovementioned authors about the performative disclosure of the self, I demonstrate that one’s identity—in the sense of ipseity—is both constituted and manifested by the commitments that the self endorses and for which it is held accountable in front of others.

中文翻译：

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“One is what one do”：从实用主义到表演性披露谁

在考虑了质疑“我”以透明和不扭曲的方式把握自己的能力的最相关批评之后，我将询问关于个人身份的第一人称权威还剩下什么。我认为不应放弃第一人称权威，而是应根据公开承诺重新表述，其他人无法替代我。在恢复了海德格尔“一个人所做的事情”的原意之后，我转向阿伦特通过政治主动性对“谁”的表演性披露，并建议将公开曝光的要求作为一种模型来阅读，以便更好地理解自我认同. 为了更清楚地辨别这种新的自我认同范式的形式，我借鉴了利科的自我证明概念，克罗威尔对我们“有责任感”的分析和拉莫尔对公开声明的描述，其中我们给自己一个公开约束的形状。在综合和延长上述作者对自我的表演性披露的考虑时，我证明了一个人的身份——在 ipseity 的意义上——既由自我认可的承诺构成和表现出来，并在这些承诺中承担责任。在别人面前。