We explore relationships between phenomenology and developmental psychology through an in-depth analysis of a particular problem in social cognition: the most fundamental access to other minds. In the first part of the paper, we examine how developmental science can benefit phenomenology. We explicate the connection between cognitive psychology and developmental phenomenology as a form of constructive phenomenological psychology. Nativism in contemporary science constitutes a strong impulse to conceive of the possibility of an innate ability to perceive others’ mental states, an idea which also has a transcendental implication. In the second part, we consider how phenomenology can contribute to developmental science. Phenomenology can go beyond the necessary evaluation and reinterpretation of experimental results. Some phenomenological notions and theories can be put forward on a par with alternative cognitive-psychological models and compete with them on grounds of empirical adequacy. For example, Husserl and Merleau-Ponty’s notion of pairing can constitute a viable account of how infants access other minds. We outline a number of ways in which this account can be tested and can thus contribute to generating empirical knowledge.

我们通过深入分析社会认知中的一个特定问题来探索现象学和发展心理学之间的关系：通往其他思想的最基本途径。在论文的第一部分，我们研究了发展科学如何使现象学受益。我们将认知心理学和发展现象学之间的联系解释为一种建设性的现象学心理学。当代科学中的本土主义构成了一种强烈的冲动，即设想一种天生的感知他人心理状态的能力的可能性，这种想法也具有先验的含义。在第二部分，我们考虑现象学如何为发展科学做出贡献。现象学可以超越对实验结果的必要评估和重新解释。一些现象学概念和理论可以与替代的认知心理学模型相提并论，并根据经验的充分性与它们竞争。例如，胡塞尔和梅洛-庞蒂的配对概念可以构成婴儿如何接触其他思想的可行解释。我们概述了可以测试该帐户的多种方式，从而有助于产生经验知识。