In the contemporary phenomenological literature it has been argued that it is possible to distinguish between two forms of selfhood: the “minimal” and “narrative” self. This paper discusses a claim which is central to this account, namely that the minimal and narrative self complement each other but are fundamentally distinct dimensions. In particular, I challenge the idea that while the presence of a minimal self is a condition of possibility for the emergence of a narrative self, the dynamics which characterise narrative selfhood do not have a structuring effect on minimal self-experience. I do so by drawing on both classical and contemporary phenomenological literature to show that at least certain forms of affective experience are complex phenomena in which minimal and narrative forms of selfhood are deeply entwined. More specifically, I claim that, due to their evaluative character, intentional and non-intentional affective states convey a pre-reflective experience of constitutive aspects of the narrative self. This enables me to argue that minimal and narrative selfhood are phenomenologically inextricable.

中文翻译：

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情感和最小自我与叙事自我的区别

在当代现象学文献中，有人认为可以区分两种形式的自我：“最低限度的”和“叙事的”自我。本文讨论了这一解释的核心主张，即最小自我和叙事自我相互补充，但本质上是不同的维度。特别是，我挑战了这样一种观点，即虽然最小自我的存在是叙事自我出现的可能性条件，但表征叙事自我的动态对最小自我体验没有结构性影响。我这样做是通过借鉴古典和当代现象学文献来表明至少某些形式的情感体验是复杂的现象，其中自我的最小和叙事形式深深地交织在一起。进一步来说，我声称，由于它们的评价特性，有意和无意的情感状态传达了叙事自我的构成方面的前反思体验。这使我能够论证，最小的和叙事的自我在现象学上是密不可分的。