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Temporality and embodied self-presence
Continental Philosophy Review ( IF 1.2 ) Pub Date : 2020-04-10 , DOI: 10.1007/s11007-020-09494-w
James Mensch

As Merleau-Ponty points out, our sense of time is that of passage. This demands that we think of time both as extended—that is, as including the past and the future—and as now, the latter being conceived as the point of expiration. The difficulty comes when try to think these separately. To consider time as extended is to think of it in terms of space—i.e., in terms of the “parts outside of parts” definitive of space. The simultaneous existence of such parts seems to exclude expiration. When, however, we consider time in terms of expiration, we face the problem of when the now expires. It cannot cease to exist in itself, since then it existed. It also cannot cease in another now, since then it did not exist. Such difficulties indicate that something is missing—something presupposed by both, which would allow us to think of expiration and temporal extension together. In this article, I argue that what is missing is the body. Its self-presence is behind these two aspects of time.

中文翻译:

时间性和具体的自我存在

正如梅洛-庞蒂指出的那样,我们对时间的感觉就是流逝。这要求我们将时间视为延长的——也就是说,包括过去和未来——以及现在,后者被认为是到期点。当尝试分别考虑这些时,困难就来了。把时间看作是延展的,就是从空间的角度来考虑它——即,根据空间的“部分之外的部分”来定义。这些部分的同时存在似乎排除了过期。然而,当我们从到期的角度考虑时间时,我们面临现在到期的问题。它不能停止存在于自身,因为它存在。它也不能在另一个现在停止,因为它不存在。这样的困难表明缺少某些东西——两者都预设的东西,这将使我们能够同时考虑到期和时间扩展。在这篇文章中,我认为缺少的是身体。它的自我存在落后于时间的这两个方面。
更新日期:2020-04-10
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