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A New Peircean Response to Radical Skepticism
Contemporary Pragmatism ( IF <0.1 ) Pub Date : 2018-02-22 , DOI: 10.1163/18758185-01501002
Justin Remhof 1
Affiliation  

The radical skeptic argues that I have no knowledge of things I ordinarily claim to know because I have no evidence for or against the possibility of being systematically fed illusions. Recent years have seen a surge of interest in pragmatic responses to skepticism inspired by C.S. Peirce. This essay challenges one such influential response and presents a better Peircean way to refute the skeptic. The account I develop holds that although I do not know whether the skeptical hypothesis is true, I still know things I ordinarily claim to know. It will emerge that although this reply appears similar to a classic contextualist response to radical skepticism, it avoids two central problems facing that response.

中文翻译:

对激进怀疑主义的新 Peircean 回应

激进的怀疑论者争辩说,我对我通常声称知道的事情一无所知,因为我没有证据支持或反对被系统地灌输幻想的可能性。近年来,人们对由 CS Peirce 启发的对怀疑主义的务实回应产生了浓厚的兴趣。这篇文章挑战了一个这样有影响力的回应,并提出了一种更好的皮尔斯式的方式来反驳怀疑论者。我开发的帐户认为,虽然我不知道怀疑论的假设是否正确,但我仍然知道我通常声称知道的事情。将会出现的是,尽管这种回答看起来类似于对激进怀疑主义的经典语境主义回应,但它避免了该回应面临的两个核心问题。
更新日期:2018-02-22
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