Can a lack of transitional justice contribute to democratic backsliding? This paper uses the case of Poland to argue that selective enforcement of transitional justice can be linked to democratic erosion. In doing so, the paper adjudicates between two theories of democratic backsliding. The first, advanced by Milan Svolik, argues that elite polarization drives erosion: when political candidates are ideologically far apart, citizens who strongly prefer one over the other may turn a blind eye to antidemocratic transgressions by their preferred candidate to prevent the competing candidate from winning. The second theory, presented by Nalepa, Vanberg, and Ciopris (NVC), describes an equilibrium where voters are uncertain whether the candidate they are dealing with is a closet autocrat or an ideological incumbent, but reelect him into office regardless. This theory posits that a closet autocrat is reelected into office because his first period actions are identical to those of an ideological incumbent. I argue that judiciary reforms in Poland reflect exactly the kind of incumbent actions that are consistent both with the actions of an ideological incumbent and with the actions of a closet autocrat. Using survey data from Poland, I find evidence of elite polarization, offering support for the first theory, but also find ample evidence of polarization in the electorate and of a belief structure supportive of the equilibrium from NVC. I present Hungary’s experience with transitional justice and the rule of law as a shadow case to illustrate similar dynamics to those taking place in Poland.

缺乏过渡正义会导致民主倒退吗？本文使用波兰的案例来论证过渡时期司法的选择性执行可能与民主侵蚀有关。在这样做的过程中，这篇论文在民主倒退的两种理论之间做出了裁决。第一个由米兰·斯沃利克 (Milan Svolik) 提出，认为精英两极分化会导致侵蚀：当政治候选人在意识形态上相距甚远时，强烈偏爱一方的公民可能会对其首选候选人的反民主违法行为视而不见，以防止竞争候选人获胜. 由 Nalepa、Vanberg 和 Ciopris (NVC) 提出的第二个理论描述了一种平衡，即选民不确定他们正在处理的候选人是壁橱独裁者还是意识形态现任者，但无论如何都会重新选举他担任公职。这个理论假设壁橱自主被重击办公室，因为他的第一期行动与意识形态现任者的行为相同。我认为，波兰的司法改革准确地反映了既与意识形态在位者的行为又与壁橱独裁者的行为相一致的现任行为。使用来自波兰的调查数据，我找到了精英两极分化的证据，为第一种理论提供了支持，但也发现了选民中两极分化和支持 NVC 均衡的信念结构的充分证据。我将匈牙利在过渡时期司法和法治方面的经验作为一个影子案例来说明与波兰发生的情况类似的动态。