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Blockchains and constitutional catallaxy
Constitutional Political Economy Pub Date : 2020-02-27 , DOI: 10.1007/s10602-020-09303-9
Alastair Berg , Chris Berg , Mikayla Novak

The proposition that constitutional rules serve as permanent, fixed points of interaction is challenged by the existence of contestable rule amendment and the emergence of de facto authority. This observation not only applies to conventional political constitutions, but to the fundamental rules which govern interactions by numerous people using new forms of technology. Blockchain technology aims to coordinate action in a world of incomplete information and opportunism, but the governance arrangements in blockchain protocols remain far from settled. Drawing upon recent theoretical developments regarding constitutional change, we interpret changes to the fundamental working rules of blockchain protocols as central to the adaptive, emergent nature of activity within this technological space. We apply this concept of “constitutional catallaxy” to selected blockchain platform case studies, illustrating the dynamism inherent in establishing protocols within the blockchain. Blockchain coordination changes and adapts not only to the technological limitations of the available protocols, but to mutual expectations and influence of interacting stakeholders.

中文翻译:

区块链和宪法催化

宪法规则作为永久的、固定的互动点的命题受到了可争议的规则修正案的存在和事实上的权威的挑战。这一观察不仅适用于传统的政治宪法,而且适用于管理众多人使用新技术形式进行互动的基本规则。区块链技术旨在在信息不完整和机会主义的世界中协调行动,但区块链协议中的治理安排仍远未解决。借鉴最近关于宪法变化的理论发展,我们将区块链协议基本工作规则的变化解释为该技术空间内活动的适应性、紧急性的核心。我们将“宪法催化”这一概念应用于选定的区块链平台案例研究,说明在区块链内建立协议所固有的活力。区块链协调不仅改变和适应可用协议的技术限制,而且适应相互作用的利益相关者的相互期望和影响。
更新日期:2020-02-27
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