Electoral rules are found to induce different incentives to politicians and have various effects on the economic performance of countries. The literature is however silent on whether this effect is homogeneous across industries within a country. This paper argues with an analytical model that an incumbent government under majoritarian rules tends to favour larger industries so as to secure votes from the employees and relatives of those industries. By constructing and exploiting an original dataset that covers disaggregated data on output growth of 61 industries in 55 countries, we find that larger industries in terms of employment size grow slower than smaller ones under non-majoritarian electoral rules, but such a correlation is absent under majoritarian rule. This result is robust across different regression models and could well be explained by favouritism of governments towards larger industries.

中文翻译：

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选举规则对制造业的影响：55个国家61个行业分​​列数据的证据

选举规则被发现对政治家产生不同的激励，并对国家的经济表现产生不同的影响。然而，文献并未说明这种影响是否在一个国家内的各个行业中是同质的。本文用一个分析模型论证了在多数统治下的现任政府倾向于支持较大的行业，以确保这些行业的雇员和亲属的投票。通过构建和利用涵盖 55 个国家 61 个行业产出增长分类数据的原始数据集，我们发现在非多数选举规则下，就就业规模而言，较大行业的增长速度低于较小行业，但在非多数选举规则下，这种相关性不存在。多数主义统治。