Under what circumstances do coalition partners tend to overspend? The so-far dominant explanation relies on the common pool resource theory—the more cabinet members there are, the higher the spending. While theoretically sound, this explanation seems to be more relevant for some cases and less for others. What could lie behind this discrepancy? While the literature to date has focused on institutional factors, we propose a mechanism that relates to voting behaviour. Relying on the concept of positional externalities, we argue that each coalition member wishes to spend relatively more resources than the other coalition member(s) to attract impressionable voters. Positional externalities, we claim, exhibit a direct positive effect on total spending and, perhaps more importantly, interact with the common pool resource factor, decreasing its relevance when they are weak.

中文翻译：

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限定政府支出中的公共池问题：位置外部性的作用

联盟伙伴在什么情况下倾向于超支？迄今为止占主导地位的解释依赖于公共池资源理论——内阁成员越多，支出就越高。虽然理论上合理，但这种解释似乎对某些情况更相关，而对其他情况则不太相关。这种差异背后的原因是什么？虽然迄今为止的文献都集中在制度因素上，但我们提出了一种与投票行为相关的机制。依靠位置外部性的概念，我们认为每个联盟成员都希望比其他联盟成员花费相对更多的资源来吸引易受影响的选民。我们声称，位置外部性对总支出有直接的积极影响，也许更重要的是，它与公共池资源因素相互作用，