The International Association for the Study of Pain’s (IASP) definition of “pain” defines it as a subjective experience. The Note accompanying the definition emphasizes that, as such, pains are not to be identified with objective conditions of body parts (such as actual or potential tissue damage). Nevertheless, it goes on to state that a pain “is unquestionably a sensation in a part or parts of the body, but it is also always unpleasant and therefore also an emotional experience.” This generates a puzzle that philosophers have been well familiar with: how to understand our utterances and judgments attributing pain to body parts. (The puzzle is, of course, general extending to all sensations routinely located in body parts.) This work tackles this puzzle. I go over various options specifying the truth-conditions for pain-attributing judgments and, at the end, make my own recommendation which is an adverbialist, qualia-friendly proposal with completely naturalistic credentials that is also compatible with forms of weak intentionalism. The results are generalizable to other bodily sensations and can be used to illustrate, quite generally, the viability of a qualia-friendly adverbialist (but naturalist and weakly intentionalist) account of perception.

中文翻译：

---

什么是身体部位的疼痛？

国际疼痛研究协会 (IASP) 对“疼痛”的定义将其定义为一种主观体验。定义附带的注释强调，因此，疼痛不能与身体部位的客观状况（例如实际或潜在的组织损伤）相鉴别。尽管如此，它继续指出，疼痛“毫无疑问是身体某个或多个部位的感觉，但它也总是不愉快的，因此也是一种情感体验。” 这就产生了一个哲学家们非常熟悉的难题：如何理解我们将疼痛归因于身体部位的话语和判断。（当然，这个谜题一般延伸到身体部位的所有感觉。）这项工作解决了这个谜题。我检查了各种选项，指定了疼痛归因判断的真实条件，并且，最后，提出我自己的建议，这是一个副词的、对质量友好的建议，具有完全自然主义的凭据，也与弱意向主义的形式兼容。结果可以推广到其他身体感觉，并且可以用来说明，非常普遍地，对知觉的友好副词（但自然主义和弱意向主义）解释的可行性。