This paper argues that Deonna and Teroni's attitudinal theory of emotions faces two serious problems. The first is that their master argument fails to establish the central tenet of the theory, namely, that the formal objects of emotions do not feature in the content of emotions. The second is that the attitudinal theory itself is vulnerable to a dilemma. By pointing out these problems, our paper provides indirect support to the main competitor of the attitudinal theory, namely, the perceptual theory of emotions.

中文翻译：

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什么样的评价状态是情绪？态度理论与情绪的知觉理论

本文认为，Deonna 和 Teroni 的情绪态度理论面临两个严重的问题。首先是他们的主要论点未能确立该理论的中心原则，即情感的形式对象并不存在于情感的内容中。二是态度理论本身容易陷入两难境地。通过指出这些问题，我们的论文为态度理论的主要竞争对手，即情绪的知觉理论提供了间接支持。